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I.INTRODUCTION

Florida's right of title includes the responsibility to hold submerged
lands under navigable waters in a "public trust" for the benefit of the
people.' The meaning of this public trust has evolved over time. Early on,
courts focused on navigational improvements, while more modem cases
have addressed environmental and conservation concerns.' In the late
1800's and early 1900's, the Florida Legislature enacted statutes
encouraging waterfront development by creating opportunities for private
landowners to vest title to submerged lands adjacent to their upland
properties.' State agents further stimulated growth by deeding other
submerged lands directly to private landowners. Most of these statutes and
policies have long since vanished, but lasting effects remain.
Based on those early statutes and grants, many Floridians believe they
own submerged lands adjacent to their upland properties. However, as the
courts recognize a more modem definition of the public trust, they have
questioned whether these early grants are still valid.4 Still other landowners
may not realize that they have vested title to submerged lands adjacent to
their upland property. In those cases, the landowners may unnecessarily be
leasing the land from the State under the mistaken belief that the land is
public trust property.
The stage was set for this modem day land battle many decades ago. In
1921, the Florida Legislature enacted the Butler Act to encourage
development and improvement of waterfront property.5 This law divested
the State of all rights and interests in submerged lands that were wharfed 6
1. See Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795,799 (Fla. 1957); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398,
407, 50 So. 826, 829 (1909); State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 100-01, 13 So. 640,
646 (1893).
2. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 712
(Cal. 1983) (in bank); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,380 (Cal. 1971) (in bank).
Editor'sNote: "'En Banc' (in the bench) is interchangeably used in the following
forms: 'in bank,' 'in banco,' 'in banc,' and 'en banke."' Smith v. County
Executive of Anne Arundel County, 47 Md. App. 65, 69 n.4, 421 A.2d 979, 981
n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. Ap. 1980) (emphasis added).

3. See Butler Act, 1921 Fla. Laws ch. 8537 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 271.01 (1997)).
4. See City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund, No. 95-3813 (Fla.4th DCA Aug. 27, 1997).
5. See Butler Act, 1921 Fla. Laws ch. 8537 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 271.01 (1997)). The
statute was named for its sponsor, Senator . Turner Butler of Duval County. See Hayes, 91 So. 2d
at 800.
6. A"wharf" is
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out, "bulkheaded,7 filled in or permanently improved" by adjacent upland
riparian8 landowners. 9 Consequently, submerged lands, usually held in trust
by the State, were transferred to private ownership. l Although the Butler
Act was repealed in 1957, the Legislature provided for the State to issue
disclaimers of title in recognition of bulkheading or improvements that
took place prior to the repeal."
Over the last four decades, courts have considered what types of
activities qualified as "bulkheading," "filling" or "permanent
improvements" under the Butler Act.12 Most recently, two Florida district
courts of appeal addressed whether dredging associated with a larger
structural project constitutes a "permanent improvement" under the Butler
[a] structure on the margin or shore of navigable waters, alongside of which
vessels can be brought for the sake of being conveniently loaded or unloaded, or
a space of ground, artificially prepared, for the reception of merchandise from a
ship or vessel, so as to promote the discharge of such vessel.
BLACK'S LAWDIC'IONARY 1595 (6th ed. 1990); see also FRANKE. MALONEYETAL, WATERLAW
AND ADMINISTRATION: TIM FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 122 (1968) (explaining that "a wharf is a
structure erected for the purpose of improving access to the water, and as a consequence for
improving navigation").
7. A "bulkhead" is "an upright partition separating compartments [or]... a structure or
partition to resist pressure or to shut off water." WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICIONARY 110 (1971).
8. "Riparian" denotes "[b]elonging or relating to the bank of a river or stream; of or on the
bank." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (6th ed. 1990). The term can be used as "relating to the
shore of the sea or other tidal water, or of a lake or other considerable body of water." Id. While the
for the
term "littoral" is more appropriate to describe land which makes up the sea shore, see id.,
purposes of this paper, the term "riparian" will be used to describe all land lying along side any
water body.
9. See Butler Act § 1. "Riparian owner" means "[o]ne who owns land on bank of river, or
one who is owner of land along, bordering upon, bounded by, fronting upon, abutting or adjacent
and contiguous to and in contact with river." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY 1327 (6th ed. 1990) (citing
State ex rel Buckson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 228 A.2d 587, 594 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967)).
10. See Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, 86 So. 2d 775,786 (Fla. 1956).
11. See 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 57-362, § 9 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 253.129 (1997)). In 1951,
the Legislature vested title to lands under tidal waters in the Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund, so the Butler Act was repealed at that time by implication. See 1951 Fla. Laws ch. 26776;
Chiles v. Floridian Sports Club, Inc., 633 So.2d 50, 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); MALONEY, supra note
6, at 367. The 1951 act "was an attempt to emasculate the Butler [Act]," and it represented "the first
significant move to curb the postwar outbreak of bay fills and strengthen the control and
management of sovereignty lands." MALONEY, supranote 6, at 367. "Under the provisions of the
1951 act upland owners were required to purchase from the [Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund] any submerged land they desired to fill prior to erecting permanent
improvements." Id.
12. See, e.g., Claughton,86 So. 2d at 786 (addressing the subject of filling); Department of
Natural Resources v. Industrial Plastics Tech., Inc., 603 So. 2d 1303, 1306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
(holding that a wooden dock and boathouse constitute "'permanent' improvements" under the
Butler Act).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[VOL 51

Act.13 The Third District found dredging is a permanent improvement
under certain circumstances and adopted a "case-by-case basis" test to
determine when those circumstances exist. 4 The Fourth District initially
followed suit.s However, in a curious turnabout, the Fourth District
withdrew its previous opinion on rehearing and ruled that dredging did not
constitute a "permanent improvement" under any circumstances. 6 The key
to the Fourth District's opinion was its use of a modem version of the
public trust doctrine to interpret the Butler Act.17 Inaddition, the Fourth
District certified a direct conflict with the Third District's decision. 8
The Florida Supreme Court has used the public trust doctrine in the past
to interpret deeds and statutes. 9 However, these past cases did not involve
a statute that was originally enacted to promote commerce and navigation,
a primary focus of the public trust doctrine.' The Florida Supreme Court
must now resolve a seemingly conflicted doctrine that would support
private ownership of submerged lands under the Butler Act with one
conception, but deny private ownership with another."'
A. The PublicTrust Doctrine
Lands submerged under navigable waters are held by the government
in trust for the use and benefit of the public. 2 When "Florida became a
state on March 3, 1845... [it] took title to all sovereignty lands within its

13. See City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund, 714 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); State v. Key WestConch Harbor, Inc., 683 So. 2d 144
(Fla. 3d DCA 1996). If dredging constitutes a "permanent improvement," a larger amount of
submerged lands will pass to private ownership under the Butler Act because dredging typically
covers a larger area of submerged land than the footprint of structural improvements.
14. Key West Conch Harbor,683 So.2d at 146.
15. See City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund, No. 95-3813, slip op. at 2-3 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 27, 1997).
16. See City of West Palm Beach, 714 So. 2d at 1063.
17. See id. at 1063.
18. See id. at 1066. Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure R. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(vi), the
Florida Supreme Court has discretion to review decisions of the district courts that are certified to
be in direct conflict.
19. See State exreL Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyananid Co., 492 So. 2d 339,34344 (Fla.1986) (holding that the Marketable Record Title Act could not operate to divest the State
of trust property by implication); Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla.603,47 So. 353, 356-57 (1908) (finding
that since submerged lands are held in trust for the benefit of the people, a deed could not divest
the State of trust lands by implication).
20. See DAVIDC. SLADE,ETAL,PturrINGTHEPuBUCTRUsTDOCrRINETOWORK 170 (1997).
21. The Florida Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on this case on June 9, 1999. See
supra note 18.
22. See State ex rel. Buford v. City of Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 102 So. 336, 340 (1924);
MALONEY, supra note 6, at 354.
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jurisdiction" in accordance with the equal footing doctrine, 23 and those
lands were subject to federal rights of navigation under the Commerce
Clause.24
Florida's common law public trust doctrine is reflected in article X,
section 11 of the Florida Constitution.' This Florida Constitutional
provision allows the sale or private use of these submerged lands if the sale

is not contrary to the public interest.26 Chapter 253 of the Florida Statutes

gives the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund
(BOTLITF) the "authority to hold sovereign land and sell it or grant private
uses subject to certain standards provided within the statute." 27
Courts historically considered the public trust to include ensuring the
rights of the public to navigate and fish in waters. 28These rights could not
be impaired except for an overriding public purpose.2 9 However, courts
have more recently expanded their recognition of the public trust to include
conservation and environmental values.3"

23. Richard Hamann & Jeff Wade, OrdinaryHigh WaterLine Determination:Legal Issues,
42 FA. L.REV. 323, 328 (1990). The equal footing doctrine is expressed in both common law and
the language of the statute providing for Florida's admission to the union: "Be it enacted by the
Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
[t]hat the State[] ... [of] Florida be... declared... [a state] of the United States of America, and
[is] hereby admitted into the Union on equal footing with the original States, in all respects
whatsoever." Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 48, § 1, 5 Stat. 742.
24. See Buford, 88 Fla. 196, 102 So. at 340; MAONEY, supranote 6, at 354.
25. See Krieterv. Chiles, 595 So. 2d 111, 111 (Fla. 3dDCA 1992); Hamann &Wade, supra
note 23, at 324. The Florida Constitution provides that "[tihe title to lands under navigable waters,
within the boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean
high water lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people." FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 11; see also State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640, 645
(1893) (stating that "[tihe control of the state for the purpose of the trust can never be lost, except
as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed
of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining").
26. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11.
27. Terry E. Lewis, et al., Sovereign Lands,in 2 FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTALAND LAND USE
LAW 21-1, 21-5 (2d ed. 1994).
28. See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); State ex rel. Ellis v.
Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 608-09,47 So. 353, 355 (1908).
29. See Ellis, 56 Fla. at 609,47 So. at 355.
30. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719
(Cal. 1983) (in bank). In Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374(Cal. 1971) (in bank), theSupreme Court
of California commented:
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses
of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is the
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for scientific study,. as open space, and as environments which
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the
scenery and climate of the area.
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In understanding the public trust doctrine, it is important to note that the
title to submerged lands is bifurcated.31 The dominant title is known as the
'jus publicum.' '32 This is "the bundle of trust rights of the public to fully
use and enjoy trust lands and waters for commerce, navigation, fishing,
bathing and other related public purposes. 33 The subservient title is known
as the 'jus privatum. 34 This portion of the title is made up of the private
proprietary rights in the use and possession of submerged lands, and it is
the portion of the title which the state conveys or passes to private owners
by operation of statute.35 The jus publicum is rarely terminated.36
Therefore, in most cases, the state retains trust responsibilities over all
submerged lands.
The leading U.S. Supreme Court case regarding the public trust
doctrine is Illinois CentralRailroad v. Illinois.37 In Illinois Central,the
Ilinois Legislature enacted a statute which granted ownership and control
of Chicago Harbor to a railroad company, but the statute was later
repealed." The issue at bar was whether the original grant of ownership
and control was valid.39 The Court concluded that the public trust doctrine
imposes restrictions on conveyances of sovereign lands so that the
transactions are voidable unless they are conveyed to facilitate a public
purpose.4 More specifically, the Court found that:
[T]he abdication of the general control of the State over lands
under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a
sea or lake... is not consistent with the exercise of that trust
which requires the government of the state to preserve such
waters for the use of the public.... The control of the state
for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to
such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the
public therein, or can be disposed of without substantial
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining.41

Id. at 380.
31. See SLADE, supra note 18, at 6.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. IL
35. See id.
36. See id. at 8.
37. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
38. See id. at 452-53.
39. See id. at 452.
40. See id.
41. Id.
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Significantly, the Illinois Centralcase dealt primarily with the right of the
state to grant actual control of a lake harbor, and not with the state's power
to alienate title to the lake bottom.42 However, the case still served as the
foundation for public trust caselaw in Florida.
Only one year after IllinoisCentral,the Florida Supreme Court decided
its first major case dealing with the public trust doctrine in State v. Black
River Phosphate Co.43 In Black River, a phosphate company claimed
ownership to a riverbed pursuant to the Riparian Rights Act of 1856
because it had conducted phosphate mining activities in those lands.' The
Florida Supreme Court found that because the statute divested the State of
trust lands, courts must look to the public purpose served by the mining
activities and determine if that purpose is consistent with a strict
construction of the public purpose aims of the statute.45 The court's use of
strict construction limited the phosphate company's ability to argue that the
statute contemplated phosphate mining. The court concluded that because
phosphate mining did not fulfill a public purpose consistent with the
statute, the land had not vested in the phosphate mining companies.'
The Florida Supreme Court later recognized, in State ex rel. Buford v.
City of Tampa,47 that the public trust doctrine arose out of the common law
and could thus be modified or refined by the legislature.
There is no provision in the Constitution of this state
42. See MALONEY, supra note 6, at 354-55. There also are federal cases which approve of a
state's ability to transfer ownership of submerged lands to private landowners. See id. (citing
Shively v. Bowiby, 152 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1894)).
43. 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640, 645 (1893).
44. See id. at 106,13 So. at 640. The Riparian Rights Act of 1856, which was later amended
by the Butler Act, vested title of submerged lands beneath navigable waters to riparian landowners.
See 1856 Fla. Laws ch. 791, § 1.
45. See Black River Phosphate,32 Fla. at 82, 13 So. at 648.
46. See id. The court found that the statute had been enacted to promote navigational
development along Florida's waters. See id. at 648-49. The court described the public trust as
follows:

[Tihe navigable waters of the state and the soil beneath them.., were held, not
for the purposes of sale or conversion into other values, or reduction into several
or individual ownership, but for the use and enjoyment of the same by all of the
people of the state for at least the purposes of navigation and fishing and other
implied purposes; and the lawmaking branch of the government of the state,
considered as the fiduciary or representative of the people, were, when dealing
with such lands and waters, limited in their powers by the real nature and purposes
of the tenure of the same, and must be held to have acted with a due regard for the
preservation of such lands and waters to the uses for which they were held.
Id. at 648.
47. 88 Fla. 196, 102 So. 336 (1924).
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expressly or impliedly forbidding the Legislature to dispose
of submerged lands lying between high and low water mark,
nor declaring any trust in the state in its tidewaters, nor the
submerged lands that may be subject to overflow at high tide.
Whatever trust was imposed was that of the common law
which the state through its Legislature assumed, and the state
accepted, with reference to such lands, when it was admitted
to the Union.
That portion of the trust, in so far as it affects the right to
navigation, was completely taken over by the national
government under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Beyond48that, the control rests with the state and the riparian
owner.

Based upon the language in the Buford opinion, one might conclude
that a state legislature could impact the public trust through legislation.
However, courts would later limit the legislature's ability to modify the
public trust doctrine by strictly construing legislative enactments which
provided for private ownership of sovereign submerged lands.49
B. History of the ButlerAct
The Butler Act reenacted the earlier Riparian Rights Act of 1856, which
vested title of submerged lands beneath navigable waters to riparian
landowners and provided those riparian landowners with the ability to
maintain an action in trespass."0 The Riparian Rights Act provided that
riparian landowners could "build wharves" or "erect warehouses or other
buildings" on the filled land." However, when the Butler Act was passed
in 1921, the Legislature included a provision that the submerged lands
would not vest in the riparian landowner unless the riparian landowner
"bulk-headed or filled in or permanently improved" the submerged land.52
The Butler Act further provided that nothing in the Act should prevent a
person "from boating, bathing or fishing in water covering the submerged
lands of [the] State or from exercising any of the privileges... allowed by

48. Id. at 207, 102 So. at 340 (emphasis added); see also MALONEY, supra note 6, at 356;
FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1997) (stating that "[tihe common and statute laws of England which are of a
general and not a local nature... down to the fourth day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force
in this state; provided the said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States and the acts of the Legislature of this state").
49. See City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund, No. 95-3813, slip op. at 3 (Fla. 4th DCA Jun. 10, 1997).
50. See 1856 Fla. Laws ch. 791, § 1.
51. Id.
52. 1921 Fla. Laws ch. 8537, § 1.
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law as to such submerged land and water covering the same."53 In State ex
rel Buford v. City of Tampa,5' the Florida Supreme Court found that the
Butler Act was a constitutional divestment of State trust lands to private
owners because the divestment was consistent with the public purpose of
improving commerce."5
Due to concern for the rights of the public in submerged lands, the
Butler Act was repealed in 1957.56 However, the repealing statute provided
that landowners who had previously "filled or developed" submerged lands
could request the BOTIITF to issue a disclaimer indicating that rights to
the submerged land had already vested in the landowner.5 7 Therefore, even
at this writing, landowners may claim ownership under the Butler Act as
long as they can prove that bulkheading, filling or other permanent
improvement occurred before the Act was repealed. 8
If. JuDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST

DOCTRINE:

DEEDS
AND THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE Acr

INTERPRETING SWAMP AND OVERFLOWED LANDS

Florida courts have used the public trust doctrine to interpret deeds as
well as statutes that purportedly transferred title to submerged lands from
the government to private landowners. These courts placed submerged
lands in a separate category of property that the legislature must
specifically devise. However, whether the public trust was recognized as
protecting commerce or environmental values was not dispositive. The
result was merely elevated status for sovereign submerged lands.
A. History of Swamp and Overflowed Lands Deeds
Florida did not gain title to its sovereignty lands through an express
grant from the Federal government.59 Instead, the sovereign lands,
described as lands under navigable a waters, passed to Florida by operation

53. Id. at § 8.
54. 88 Fla. 196, 102 So. 336 (1924).
55. See id. at 207, 340.
56. See 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 57-362, § 9 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 253.129 (1997)); Board of
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assoc., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 938
(Fla. 1987).
57. See FLA. STAT. § 253.129 (1997).
58. See FLA. ADnIN. CODE ANN. R.18-21.019 (1998).
59. See Michael L. Rosen, Public andPrivateOwnershipRights in Lands UnderNavigable
Waters: The Governmental/ProprietaryDistinction,34 FLA. L. REV. 561,581-82 (1982).
60. The thorny issue of navigability has been heavily litigated in Florida. See generally,e.g.,
Baker v. State, 87 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1956) (en banc) (discussing whether the waters of Cromartie
Ann-a part of Lake lamonia-were navigable in law and fact); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398,
402, 50 So. 826, 888 (discussing whether a Leon county lake was a navigable body of water);
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of law when it became a state.61 Therefore, there was no official
designation of which lands were sovereign submerged lands.62 "This
uncertainty was complicated by the subsequent federal grant to the state in
1850 of swamp and overflowed lands.63 Swamp and overflowed lands
included the beds of non-navigable waterbodies as well as uplands which
bordered on the navigable rivers, lakes and tidal waters."' The status of
the submerged lands adjacent to the uplands was ambiguous. It was not
clear which lands were sovereign lands, which the State owned as a result
of its entry to the Union in 1845, and which lands were swamp and
overflowed lands, granted to the State in 1850.
Approximately "two-thirds of the land area of Florida was ultimately
transferred to the State pursuant to the 1850 Federal Swamp and
Overflowed Lands Act."5 The Florida Legislature delegated responsibility
for the swamp and overflowed lands to the BOTIITF.66 To encourage
growth and generate revenue, the BOTITF began to sell the swamp and

Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Florida Pub. Utils. Co., 599 So. 2d
1356, 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (discussing whether a body of water not meandered in a federal
survey will still be considered navigable). Essentially, navigability is a question of fact based on
whether the water, in its ordinary and natural condition, as of the time Florida became a state, is of
sufficient size and permanence to be useful as a highway for public commercial transportation. See
Rosen, supra note 59, at 584. If a water body is found navigable, the state holds the submerged
lands under those waters pursuant to the public trust, up to the ordinary high water line in non-tidal
waters and up to the mean high water line for tidal waters. See id.
61. See Rosen, supra note 59, at 581.
62. See id. (citing United States v. 2,899.17 Acres of Land, 269 F. Supp. 903,907-08 (M.D.
Fla. 1967)).
63. Id. at n. 582,140 (citing Act of Sept. 28,1850, ch. 84,9 Stat. 519 (codified at43 U.S.C.
§§ 981-994) (1976)).
64. Id. The Florida Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603,47 So. 353
(1908), defined swamp and overflowed lands as follows:
Within the meaning of this act of Congress, swamp lands, as distinguished from
overflowed lands, are such as require drainage to dispose of needless water or
moisture on or in the lands, in order to make them fit for successful and useful
cultivation. Overflowed lands are those that are covered by non-navigable waters,
or are subject to such periodical or frequent overflows of water, salt or fresh (not
including lands between high and low water marks ofnavigable streams or bodies
of water nor lands covered and uncovered by the ordinary daily ebb and flow of
normal tides of navigable waters), as to require drainage or levees or embankments
to keep out the water and thereby render the lands suitable for successful
cultivation.
Id. at 615-16, 47 So. at 357.
65. Joseph W. Jacobs & Alan B. Fields, Sovereignty Lands in Florida:Lost in a Swamp of
Ambiguity, 38 FLA. L. REV. 347, 353 (1986).
66. See id. at 354-55 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 253.001-.83 (1985)). The BOTIITF is made up
of the Governor and Cabinet. See id. at 355.
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overflowed lands. 67 However, due to surveying discrepancies between the
State, and federal government, some of the deeds issued by the BOTIITF
did not reference whether the conveyances transferred submerged lands
under navigable or non-navigable waters, or whether the conveyances
contained exceptions stating that sovereign lands had not been
transferred. 68 The significance of this was that if the transfer included
submerged lands under navigable waters, the lands would be sovereign and
subject to the public trust.
Courts ultimately had to interpret the BOTIITF deeds.69 For example,
in State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing,70 the Florida Supreme Court addressed
whether a BOTITF deed for swamp and overflowed lands to a private
landowner conveyed sovereign submerged lands because it did not
expressly except the sovereign submerged lands.71 The court recognized
that the State took title to all sovereign submerged lands in Florida when
it became a state in 1845, and that these lands were not the same lands
transferred pursuant to the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act of 1850.72
The court further noted that the sovereign submerged lands are held by the
State pursuant to the public trust doctrine. 73 The court reasoned that
because the lands are held in trust for the benefit of the people, they could
not be divested by implication.7' Therefore, the deed from the BOTIITF
which purported to grant swamp and overflowed lands, but did not
expressly except sovereign submerged lands, did not convey any sovereign
submerged lands because the lands had not been specifically described.75
The court in Ellis thus used the public trust doctrine to interpret a deed.
Even though the deed did not expressly except sovereign lands, the court
afforded additional protection to the lands because of their trust status. In
addition to deeds, courts would later use the public trust doctrine to
interpret statutes that had been used to divest the state of trust lands.
B. Marketable Record Title Act
The Florida Legislature enacted the Marketable Record Title Act
(MRTA) 76 for the express purpose of "simplifying and facilitating land title

67. See id.
68. See id. at 356-57.

69. See id. at 357.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

56 Fla. 603,47 So. 353 (1908).
See id. at 606,47 So. at 354.
See id. at 614-15,47 So. at 357.
See id. at 612,47 So. at 356.
See id. at 612-14,47 So. at 356-57.
See id.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 712.01-.10 (1997).
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transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record title. '77 Prior to
MRTA, title examiners had to review decades of title records to ensure that
a landowner had proper legal title. MRTA shortened this review period to
thirty years.78 Under MRTA, a landowner must show: (1) the owner has the
legal capacity to own land; (2) a title transaction purporting to create or
transfer the estate claimed; and (3) the title transaction apparently vesting
the claimed interest in the owner appeared of record for thirty years. 79 If an
owner can show each of these elements, all title transactions, acts, and
claims predating the thirty year period are declared "null81 and void,"' and
the owner is declared to have a marketable record title.
The MRTA was subject to several exceptions for certain lands;
however, actions filed prior to October 1, 1986 involving sovereign lands
were not excepted. 2 Consequently, several lawsuits ensued over whether
the State could be divested of trust property by operation of the MRTA
based upon land deals which took place before October 1, 1996.3
Public trust concepts were evident in the Florida Supreme Court's
decision in Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.84 In
Coastal,the Florida Supreme Court addressed three questions certified as
having great public importance. The two questions of relevance to this
Casenote were: "(I) Do the.., swamp and overflowed lands deeds issued
by the trustees include sovereignty lands below the ordinary high water
mark of navigable rivers? [and] ... (Em) Does the marketable record title
act.., operate to divest the trustees of title to sovereignty lands...?,,s
The Coastalcourt's approach to the swamp and overflowed lands deeds
was straightforward. The federal government had no authority to convey
Florida's sovereign submerged lands when it enacted the Swamp and
Overflowed Lands Act in 1850. Therefore, no sovereign lands were
conveyed by the Act, and any subsequent deeds for swamp and overflowed
lands did not include sovereign submerged lands.8 6
With regard to the MRTA question, the court first noted that sovereign
submerged lands are held in trust for the people, so they cannot be divested

77. 1963 Fla. Laws ch. 63-133, § 10.
78. See FLA. STAT. § 712.01 (1997).
79. See FLA. STAT. § 712.02 (1997).
80. FLA. STAT. § 712.04 (1997).
81. See FLA. STAT. § 712.02 (1997).
82. See FLA. STAT. § 712.03 (1997).
83. See Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339,341 (Fla. 1986);
Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977,985-86 (Fla. 1976); Sawyer v. Modrall, 286 So. 2d 610,
612-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
84. See Coastal,492 So. 2d at 339.
85. Id. at 341.
86. See id. at 341-42.
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by implication. 7 Second, the court observed that MRTA did not make a
specific reference to sovereign submerged lands, as it was first passed in
1963. Therefore, the court concluded that the "legislature did not intend to
make MRTA applicable to sovereignty [submerged] lands."8 "
The Coastalcourt interpreted swamp and overflowed lands deeds and
the MRTA under the rubric of the public trust doctrine. Yet, the court's
decisions did not turn on whether the public trust doctrine of the time
recognized navigational or environmental values. The public trust doctrine
served to elevate sovereign submerged lands into a special category.
However, a later court would apply the modem, conservation-focused
public trust doctrine and yield an outcome which was arguably far different
from the Legislature's original intent.
1iH. JNTERPRETATION OFTHE RIPARIAN
RIGHTS Acr AND THE BUTLER Acr

The public trust doctrine also has played a role in courts' various
interpretations of the Riparian Rights and Butler Acts. While earlier courts
utilized a version of the public trust doctrine which focused on commerce,
later courts envisioned a conservation-focused public trust. Even though
the latter interpretation of the public trust may be consistent with a modem
concept of the government's role to protect the environment, it may be
unfair to use a conservation-based public trust standard to interpret statutes
which were enacted when the public trust focused more on commerce.
A. Impact of the Public Trust Doctrine on the
Meaning of "PermanentImprovement"
The phrase "permanent improvement" in the Butler Act has been a
primary source of recent litigation. 9 While part of the controversy stems
from disagreement over whether the Butler Act should be strictly
construed,9' a review of the cases indicates that the courts still look to the
intent of the statute.
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the strict construction issue in

87. See id. at 343.
88. Id. at 344.

89. See, e.g., City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund, No. 95-3813, slip. op. at 1 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 27, 1997); State v. Key West Conch
Harbor, Inc., 683 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
90. Compare City ofWest Palm Beach, No. 95-3813, slip. op. at 3 (applying "case-by-case'"
type test to Butler Act), with City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund, 714 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (ruling that pursuant to the
Public Trust Doctrine, the Butler Act should be strictly construed because it divests the state of trust
property).
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State v. Black River PhosphateCo. 91 In Black River, a phosphate company
claimed the right to mine submerged lands adjacent to its upland
landholdings, pursuant to the Riparian Rights Act of 1856.92 The court
initially stated that because submerged lands are held in trust for the people
by the State, any grant of those lands must be "strictly construed, or be
taken most beneficially in favor of the state or public, and against the
grantee." 93 The court further stated that any grant of land must be indicated
"by express words or necessary implication." 94
Explaining that the intent of the grant is ascertained from the
circumstances, the court reviewed the purpose of the Riparian Rights Act. 95
The court determined that the Riparian Rights Act had the "distinct public
purpose of connecting the shore and banks of bays, harbors, and streams
with the channel of navigable waters."' Since mining the submerged lands
would not enhance the public purpose of the Act, the court concluded that
mining was not intended as an activity authorized by the Act.' Therefore,
the court ruled against the mining company.9"
The Florida Supreme Court also addressed the issue of strict
construction of the Butler Act in Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund v. Claughton.99 In Claughton, the owner of an island, which was
created over the years by filing submerged lands, claimed he could
bulkhead lands adjacent to the island and vest title under the Butler Act." °
A smaller portion of the island had originally been granted to a former
owner by the State, and subsequent landowners later enlarged the island by
dredging fill from adjacent submerged lands."' The court explained that
any grant in derogation of land held in public trust must be "strictly
construed in favor of the sovereign."" 2 The court stated it could not
ascribe to the Legislature, in the passage of either the Riparian
Act of 1856 or the Butler Bill, the intention of authorizing one
acquiring title to sovereignty lands from the Trustees to fill
such lands beyond the boundaries conveyed without first

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

32 Fla. 82, 106-07, 13 So. 640, 648 (1893).
See L at 83, 13 So. at 640.
Id. at 107, 13 So. at 648.
Id.
See id.
IL
See id. at 113, 13 So. at 650.
See id. at 129, 13 So. at 655.
86 So. 2d 775, 782 (Fla. 1956).
See id.
See id. at 786.
Id.
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acquiring the title to such additional lands created by such
fill.103
Therefore, the court found that the owner of the island did not have the
ability to acquire further title to lands surrounding the island by
bulkheading.' °
Based upon the foregoing cases, it is clear that grants in derogation of
the public trust must be strictly construed in favor of the State. However,
it is not clear whether strict construction requires express language. For
example, the court in Black River looked to the intent of the statute to
determine whether mining was authorized in submerged lands.10 Similarly,
the court in Claughton looked beyond the language of the Butler Act to
reach its decision. °" Therefore, strict construction of the Butler Act can be
achieved either through express terms or examining whether an
interpretation is consistent with the intent of the statute. Moreover, since
the intent of the Butler Act was to improve commerce by improving access
to navigable waters, activities which improve access may vest title even if
those activities are not expressly referenced in the Butler Act.
B. Dredgingas a PermanentImprovement
Dredged lands were first implicated as permanent improvements under
the Butler Act by Florida's First District Court of Appeal." In
Jacksonville Shipyards, the court addressed the Department of Natural
Resource's (DNR's) denial of an application for a disclaimer because the
lands had not been filled."08 The upland riparian landowner applied for the
disclaimer based on what the court described as "certain structural
additions" to submerged lands in the St. Johns River "including piers,
docks, wharves, dry docks, railroad trestles, and dredging."'" However, the
DNR denied the landowner's request for a disclaimer, alleging that
submerged lands had to be filled in order to vest title under the Butler
Act. " ° The court concluded that title could vest under the Butler Act by
filling in as well as by making permanent improvements, such as those
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Seei.
See Black River, 32 Fla. at 106-07, 13 So. at 648.
See Claughton, 86 So.2d at 786.

107. See Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Department ofNatural Resources, 466 So. 2d 389,390
(Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
108. See id.
at 391. DNR's rule, promulgated pursuant to section 253.129, Florida Statutes,
provided that filling was the only means to vest title under the Butler Act. See id. at n.7 (citing FLA.
ADMIN. CODE § 16Q-21.14 (1983)).

109. Id. at 390. The court also listed periodic dredging of open waters as one of the
"improvements" made before the Butler Act was repealed by implication in 1951. See id. at 390 n.3.

110. Seeid.at391.
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made to the submerged lands at issue in the case.1 1 Therefore, the court
found the DNR's rule invalid for being in conflict with section 253.129,
Florida Statutes." 2 Moreover, the court remanded the case so that the
landowner could be issued a disclaimer to all
the submerged lands at issue,
3
dredged.1
been
had
which
those
including
Jacksonville Shipyards has been cited as support for the proposition
that submerged lands, dredged as part of an overall project, become the
property of the upland riparian landowner pursuant to the Butler Act.1 4
Instead of finding that the landowner had title to the lands only directly
under the structural improvements in the shipyard, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal ruled that title vested in the entire extent of the submerged lands
of the shipyard." 5 Thus, the court included the dredged lands by
implication. However, some parties argue that the inclusion of dredged
lands as part of the vested lands was not even at issue in the case." 6 Citing
City of Miami Beach v. Traina,117 they argue Jacksonville Shipyardsdoes
not speak to dredged lands because the dredged land issue was not properly
presented."' Even though dredging was not at issue in Jacksonville
Shipyards, the court did address whether improvements made throughout
the shipyardwere permanent improvements pursuant to the Butler Act." 9
Thus, the ruling in Jacksonville Shipyards should apply to whether
dredging is a permanent improvement when associated with a larger
improvement project.

111. See id.
112. See id. Interestingly, the BOTIITF rules currently only provide for an application for
disclaimer to confirm title to former sovereign landsfilled prior to May 29, 1951. See FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. R.18-21.019(1) (1998).
113. See JacksonvilleShipyards,466 So. 2d at 393.
114. See State v. Key West Conch Harbor, Inc., 683 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996);
Appellant's Initial Brief at 16, City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund, 714 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (No. 95-3813); City ofWest Palm
Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal ImprovementTrust Fund, No. 95-383, slip. op. at 3 (Fla.
4th DCA Aug. 27, 1997).
115. See JacksonvilleShipyards,466 So. 2d at 393.
116. See Appeilees' AnswerBrief at 14, City of West Palm Beach (No. 95-3813); City of West
Palm Beach 714 So. 2d at 1065.
117. 73 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1954). In Traina,the Florida Supreme Court explained that it would
not hold a lower court in error for not considering certain statutes in its determination when the
statutes were not presented to the court during trial. See id. at 861.
118. See Appellees' Answer Brief at 14, City ofWest Palm Beach (No. 95-3813); City of West
Palm Beach, 714 So. 2d at 1065.
119. See Jacksonville Shipyards,466 So. 2d at 391.
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C. Key West Conch Harbor. Dredging
Vests Title Under the ButlerAct
Eleven years after Jacksonville Shipyards, Florida's Third District
Court of Appeal addressed the dredged land issue."2 In Key West Conch
Harbor, the court examined whether dredging in connection with
construction of moorings and a dock constituted sufficient
"permanent
121
improvements" to vest title pursuant to the Butler Act.

The BOTIITF argued that the Butler Act only applies to specific
improvements such as wharves and filling.'2 Further, BOTIITF contended
that the Butler Act should be strictly construed because the statute divests
12
the State of sovereign lands held in trust for the people of Florida. 1
Therefore, "[a] broader interpretation of Butler Act 'improvements' to
include merely dredging in open waters would result in such extensive
conveyance
of sovereignty lands that the Act would violate the public
4
trust.'

12

However, the Third District Court of Appeal disagreed with the
BOTIT.'" The court reasoned that since other courts have considered
docks and piers sufficient permanent improvements pursuant to the Butler
Act in the past, 26 the dredging necessary to access those docks must also
be considered a permanent improvement.127 Therefore, the court concluded
that without the dredging, the dock or pier would be useless to the
landowner." The court implied that a useless dock would not fulfill the
purpose of the Butler Act which was to encourage commerce, so the
Legislature must have intended to include dredged lands within the
meaning of "permanent improvements."' 29
Additionally, the court cited Jacksonville Shipyards as an example of

120. See State v. Key West Conch Harbor, Inc., 683 So. 2d 144,145-46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
121. See id at 145. In this case, the plaintiff, Key West Conch Harbor, Inc., sought to quiet
title to submerged lands, also known as "Key West Bight," which made up part of its marina in
South Florida. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 1, Key West Conch Harbor,Inc. (No. 95-1275). In
1942, Key West Conch's predecessors in title obtained an Army Corps of Engineers permit which
allowed dredging 500 feet waterward from a bulkhead and that the dredged material would be
deposited behind the bulkhead. See id. at 2. By 1948, the predecessor in title completed the
dredging and bulkheading and also had constructed two piers. See idi; Appellee's Answer Brief at
1, Key West Conch Harbor,Inc. (No. 95-1275).
122. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 4, Key West Conch Harbor,Inc. (No. 95-1275).
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See Key West Conch Harbor,683 So. 2d at 145.
126. See id. (citing Department of Natural Resources v. Industrial Plastics Tech., Inc., 603 So.
2d 1303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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where dredging in connection with a permanent improvement was
considered sufficient to vest title pursuant to the Butler Act.130 The court
acknowledged that the Jacksonville Shipyards opinion did not expressly
state that dredging associated with structural improvements vested title. 3 1
However, the court did find that because the dredged land was found to be
vested in the upland riparian owner, the Fifth District Court of Appeal's
underlying rationale must have been that the dredging was also a
permanent improvement in that instance.13 ' Based on the result in
Jacksonville Shipyards, the court concluded that whether dredging
constituted a "permanent improvement" should be determined on a "caseby-case basis" considering "[tihe 33surrounding land, and other
improvements under the [Butler] Act."'
Judge Gersten dissented in Key West Conch Harbor, arguing that
because modem day values about coastal commerce have changed, public
policy dictates that submerged land should not be vested in private
business pursuant to the Butler Act."M Further, he asserted that Jacksonville
Shipyards did not directly address the issue of incidental dredging, and
thus, should not be persuasive. 3 He pointed to the repeal of the Butler Act
as a signal of legislative intent with regard to divestment of submerged
lands, so the majority exceeded its authority by giving validity to the Butler
Act. 36 Characterizing Butler Act claims as a "Great Land Giveaway,"
Judge Gersten concluded by encouraging judgments which would better
protect the State's submerged lands.' 37
Judge Gersten adhered to the concept that the modem day definition of
the public trust should be applied to the Butler Act.'38 Judge Gersten's
dissent implied that the public trust doctrine could invalidate a state
" While these arguments did not persuade
statute.'39
the other judges in the
Third District Court of Appeal, Judge Gersten's words would soon become
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id.at 145-46.
See id. at 146.
See id.
l

134. See id.
at 146-47 (Gersten, L,dissenting).
135. See id. at 147 (Gersten, J., dissenting).
136. See id. (Gersten, J.,
dissenting). Judge Gersten implied that there is no present avenue to
claim title pursuant to the Butler Act. See id. (Gersten, J.,dissenting). Section 253.129 of the
Florida Statutes provides that the BOTI1TF issue disclaimers for those lands "filled or developed"
prior to the repeal of the Butler Act. However, it does not appear that Key West Conch Harbor
brought suit pursuant to the disclaimer statute. See id. at 144-45.
137. Id.at 148 (Gersten, J., dissenting).
138. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709,
712 (Cal. 1983); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,380 (Cal. 1974).
139. See Key West Conch Harbor,683 So. 2d at 146 (Gersten, J.,
dissenting). But see FLA.
STAT. § 253.129 (1997) (providing that the BOTIITF shall issue disclaimers for those lands "filled
or developed" prior to the repeal of the Butler Act).
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the basis for a major change of heart for the Fourth District.
D. City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. Dredging
Does Not Vest Title Under the Butler Act
While the Third District was grappling with the dredging issue in Key
West, a similar case was developing farther up Florida's coast. The City of
West Palm Beach (City) filed suit against the BOTIITF to quiet title to
submerged lands popularly known as the Palm Harbor Marina. " The City
claimed it had vested title to the entire marina, including the dredged
portions. 141 The BOTlITF counterclaimed seeking to quiet title to the same
submerged lands. 42 The trial court found that the City only owned the land
directly beneath four concrete piers, and the City appealed. 43
Upon initial hearing of the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
found in favor of the City." The court began its opinion by stating that the
issue on appeal was "whether all the activities of the city in constructing
a municipal marina... including... dredging of the boat basins...
resulted in apermanentimprovementso that title vested in accordance with
the Butler Act.' 145 Relying on Key West ConchHarbor,the court explained
that dredging was not the issue, but rather the issue was whether all the
marina activities together constituted a permanent improvement. 46 The
court mirrored the language ofKey West ConchHarborand found that the
pier and marina would be useless without the dredged area and
accompanying boat basin. 47 Therefore, the court concluded that the
dredged basin must be considered part of the structural permanent

140. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 1, City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the
Internal ImprovementTrust Fund, 714 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (No. 95-3813). This claim
arose from the City's construction of the marina which consisted of filled lands, four concrete piers,
a dredged channel to the Intracoastal Waterway, and a dredged boat basin. See id. at 2-4. The War
Department (now known as the Army Corps of Engineers) issued a permit to the City to construct
the marina in January 1947. See id. at 2.
141. See id. at 2.
142. See id.
at 1.Leisure Resorts, Inc., which leased the disputed lands from the City, filed suit
against the City claiming the City had violated its lease agreement because it did not own the lands.
See id. Leisure Resorts' suit was consolidated with the suit between the City and the BOTIITF. See
id.
143. See id.
144. See City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund, No. 95-3813, slip. op. at I (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 27, 1997). Judge Polen authored the opinion
while Judges Pariente and Gross concurred. See id.
at 1-4.
145. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
146. See id.
147. See id.
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improvements in the marina."'
The court also agreed that the JacksonvilleShipyardsopinion addressed
dredged lands by implication, and it cited that opinion as another example
where dredged lands were considered a "permanent improvement." '4 9
Finally, the court adopted the "case-by-case basis" test enunciated in Key
150 It found that because the surrounding
West Conch Harbor.
improvements to Palm Harbor Marina would be useless without the
dredged area, the dredged area must be included as part of an entire
permanent improvement."' Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court
and found title to the entire marina vested in the City.152 Therefore, in this
instance, dredging served to divest the State of title to submerged lands
under the Butler Act. "
Nearly ten months later on rehearing, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal withdrew its previous opinion and found in favor of the
BOTIITF. 54 This time the court characterized the issue as whether the City
had title to the submerged land "which could give rise to expansion of the
existing marina or even to the filling in of the submerged lands for more
intensive development."155 The court's recharacterization of the issue
emphasizes its use of the modem day public trust doctrine, an approach
which focuses more on the environmental impacts of the statutory
interpretation. Relying on Black River and Claughton,the court found that
the "permanent improvement" language of the Butler Act should be strictly
Act divests the State of submerged lands held in
construed because the
156
trust for the people.
Analyzing the language of the Butler Act, the court found that the
general term "permanent improvement" found in paragraph four of section
one refers back to the specific improvements, such as building wharves or

148. See ic at 2-3.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. The court further explained that concerns raised in Judge Gersten's dissent in Key
West Conch could be adequately addressed by the case-by-case basis test. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund, 714 So. 2d 1060, 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Judge Gross wrote the opinion while Judge
Pariente concurred. See id. Judge Polen, author of the previous opinion, dissented. See id. at 1066
(Polen, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1061. The court excerpted a portion of the trial court transcript in which William
P. Doney, arguing for the City, was asked whether the City could fill the dredged area if the court
found title vested pursuant to the Butler Act. After the court recognized that permits could be a
"real problem," Mr. Doney responded that "in theory" the City could fill the lands if it prevailed
in this case. Id. at n.2.
156. See icL at 1063.
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filling, referenced in section one, paragraph three of the Act.1 57 The court
further noted that including dredged lands as "permanent improvements"
would be inconsistent with section eight of the Butler Act which
"contemplates that title will pass when the public's access to the
submerged land has been completely foreclosed by development." '
Moreover, the court stated that if the Legislature intended dredging to vest
title pursuant to the Butler Act, it would have specifically referenced
dredging in the statute.1 59 Therefore, the court found that dredging does not

157. See id. at 1064 (citing Dunham v. State, 140 Fla. 754,192 So. 324,326 (1939) (quoting
ExparteAmos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289, 293 (1927))). The Butler Act provided as follows:
Sect.1 Whereas, It is for the benefit of the State of Florida that water front
property be improved and developed; and
[Paragraph 2]
Whereas, the State being the proprietor of all submerged lands and water
privileges within its boundaries, which prevents the riparian owners from
improving their water lots; therefore
[Paragraph 3]
The State of Florida, for the consideration above mentioned, subject to any
inalienable trust under which the State holds said lands, divests itself of all right,
title and interest to all lands covered by water lying in front of any tract of land
owned by the United States or by any person, natural or artificial, or by any
municipality, county or governmental corporation underthe laws of Florida, lying
upon any navigable stream or bay of the sea or harbor, as far as to the edge of the
channel, and hereby vests the full title
to the same, subject to said trust in and to
the riparian proprietors giving them the full right and privilege to build wharves
into streams or waters of the bay or harbor as far as may be necessary to affect the
purposes described, and to fill up from the shore, bank or beach as far as may be
desired, not obstructing the channel, but leaving full space for the requirements
of commerce, and upon landssofilled in to erect warehouses,dwellings orother
buildingsand also the right to prevent encroachments of any other person upon
all such submerged land in the direction of their lines continued to the channel by
bill in chancery or at law, and to have and maintain action of trespass in any court
of competent jurisdiction in the State, for any interference with such property, also
confirming to the riparian proprietors all improvements which may have
heretofore been made upon submerged lands.
[Paragraph 4]
Provided, that the grant herein made shall apply to and affect only those
submerged lands which have been, or may be hereafter, actually bulk-headed or
filled in or permanently improved continuously from high water mark in the
direction of the channel, or as near in the direction of the channel as practicable
to equitably distribute the submerged lands, and shall in no wise affect such
submerged lands until actually filled in or permanently improved.
1921 Fla. Laws Ch. 8537, § 1 (emphasis added).
158. City of West Palm Beach, 714 So. 2d at 1064.
159. See id,
The court also implied that since the Florida Supreme Court found that structures
such as wooden docks were not sufficient to qualify as permanent improvements, dredging could
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constitute a "permanent improvement" under any circumstance.' 60
The court distinguished its decision from Jacksonville Shipyards,
asserting that the court in that case was not specifically faced with the
161
question of whether dredging constitutes a permanent improvement.
Moreover, the court pointed out that while the Jacksonville Shipyards
opinion included the dredged lands, such lands were not actually
permanently improved due to the periodic maintenance dredging conducted
in the shipyard. 62 The court then criticized the rulings in Jacksonville
Shipyardsand Key West Conch for not recognizing the strict construction
rule from Black River and Claughton 63 It further stated that the "case-bycase" standard was "too amorphous... to decide the issue of title to
irreplaceable submerged land within the public trust."'6' Lastly, it certified
conflict with Key West Conch Harbor, pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(vi). 65
It is unclear why the Fourth District withdrew its previous decision. The
case was assigned to the same three judges, one of whom dissented on
rehearing.166 In addition, the court did not explain its turnabout in its
opinion. This author can only hypothesize that the initial opinion applied
the earlier form of the public trust doctrine, and the later opinion applied
a modem view of the public trust doctrine.
E. Analysis of City of West Palm Beach v. BOTI1TF
On rehearing, the Fourth District Court of Appeal criticized the ruling
in Key West Conch, and essentially its own earlier ruling, for not strictly
construing the Butler Act, for making a decision which was against public
policy, and for applying the "amorphous" case-by-case test. 67 However,
the Fourth District's own opinion is not immune to criticism. For instance,
even if strict construction is applicable to this case, the Butler Act may still
be construed to include dredging. In addition, the threats to the public cited
by the court would still be present whether or not it found that dredging of
lands vested title in the City. Finally, the case-by-case basis test, while not
meticulously applied by the court in its initial opinion and in Key West
Conch, may still be sufficient to deal with activities which will not alone

not qualify either. See id. at 1065 (citing Williams v. Guthrie, 102 Fla. 1047, 137 So. 682, 686
(1931)).
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1065-66.
162. See id. at 1065.
163. See id. at 1065-66.
164. Id. at 1066.
165. See id.; see also supra note 18.
166. See City of West Palm Beach, 714 So. 2d at 1060, 1066.
167. See id. at 1065-66.
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vest title under the Butler Act.
1. Use of Strict Construction and Alternative
Interpretations of the Butler Act
At first glance, the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Black
River Phosphate6 ' would seem dispositive with regard to whether
dredging constitutes a permanent improvement pursuant to the Riparian
Rights Act, and subsequently, the Butler Act. In Black River, the Florida
Supreme Court held that the Riparian Rights Act did not give riparian
landowners the right to "dig up the soil independent of the control and
regulation of the state, and convert it to his own use."'6 9 However, Black
River only involved dredging to the extent it was necessary to mine
phosphate from a river. The dredging did not further the public purpose of
waterfront development as required in the Act. Therefore, the Act did not
vest title to the submerged lands in the phosphate companies because their
dredging was not consistent with the improvements contemplated in the
Act. By contrast, dredging as part of larger marina or harbor development
does enhance navigation and commerce. Therefore, Black River does not
apply to dredging associated with larger developments.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also found that the First District's
references to "dredging" in Jacksonville Shipyards were dicta and hence
were not dispositive on the question of whether dredging constituted a
permanent improvement pursuant to the Butler Act. 7 However, as
representatives of Key West Conch Harbor pointed out, the First District
stated that the dredging facts were "not at issue" in JacksonvilleShipyards
because those facts had been stipulated by the parties. 7 ' The dredging
aspect was not dicta merely because the court only made a decision based
upon law. Otherwise, such decisions would have no persuasive or
precedential value for cases with similar fact patterns. Further, Jacksonville
Shipyards presents an analogous scenario to City of West Palm Beach,
namely, dredging associated with a larger harbor improvement project.
While the Florida Supreme Court has applied strict construction to the
Butler Act, dredging may still be considered a "permanent improvement"
under the Act. In Black River, the Florida Supreme Court found that
mining in submerged lands was not an activity intended by the Riparian
Rights Act because it would not encourage waterfront development and the

168. 32Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893).
169. Id. at 133, 13 So. at 650.
170. See City of West Palm Beach, 714 So. 2d at 1065; see also Appellant's Initial Brief at 8,
n. 4, State v. Key West Conch Harbor, Inc., 683 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (No. 95-1275).
171. Appellee's Answer Brief at 4, Key West Conch Harbor, Inc. (No. 95-1275).
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connection of the channel with the shoreline, the intent of the Act. 172
Similarly, in Claughton,the Florida Supreme Court strictly construed the

Butler Act by ruling it was not the intent of the Act to allow the owner of
an island, created by filling submerged land, to make additional claims to
submerged land under the Act. 73 If dredging was contemplated in the Act,
the Florida Supreme Court could have dispensed of the case immediately.
However, the court instead conducted a lengthy analysis of why mining, an
arguably more damaging activity than dredging, was not consistent with
the goals of the Act. Comparatively, dredging associated with development
of marinas or docks is essential to their operation. In fact, there would be
no commerce and no waterfront development without the means for ships
to get to the marina or docks. Therefore, dredging in this context is

consistent with the intent of the Act. 74

Further, at the time the Butler Act was enacted, public trust purposes
included navigation, boating and fishing.?75 Consistently, the Butler Act
authorized public grants of land for the benefit of commerce.176 The
preamble to the Riparian Rights Act provided: "Whereas, It is for the
benefit of commerce that wharves be built and warehouses erected for
facilitating the landing and storage of goods; and whereas, the State being
the proprietor of all submerged lands and water privileges, within its
boundaries, which prevents the riparian owners from improving their
waterlots... ."" Because the public land grants were authorized for a
public purpose, the terms of the Butler Act should be construed to include

172. See Black River, 32 Fla. at 82, 13 So. at 648.
173. See Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, 86 So. 2d 775,786 (Fla. 1956).
174. Several Florida courts have highlighted the commerce development focus of the Butler
Act: "Mhe Butler Act had as its major objective the creation or evolution of commerce in
connection with ports of the State. Another purpose was to encourage upland owners to improve
their waterfront property as specified in the Act." Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of
Natural Resources, 466 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). "It is clear that [the Butler Act]..
. had no other purpose than to stimulate and encourage the improvement of submerged lands and
to improve the foreshore in the interest of commerce and navigation." Duval Eng'g & Contracting
Co. v. Sales, 77 So. 2d 431,433 (Fla. 1954). "The purpose of the [Butler] Act... [is] to encourage
riparian owners to improve their waterfront property as therein specified, but making the full title
conditional upon the actual completion of the improvement or development mentioned in the Act.'
Holland v. Ft. Pierce Fin. & Constructing Co., 157 Fla. 649, 657,27 So. 2d 76, 81 (1946). Further,
the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the legislature intended the Butler Act to encourage
riparian owners to improve submerged lands because the state could not afford to perform all such
improvements. See Black River, 32 Fla. at 110, 13 So. at 649 (explaining that the State, being
unprepared "to undertake work of building such wharves or filling the water... determined to
encourage the riparian owner to do what the state alone could do of itself or authorize another to
do").
175. See Black River, 32 Fla. at 82, 13 So. at 645.
176. See 1921 Fla. Laws ch. 8537.
177. 1856 Fla. Laws ch. 1856 (emphasis added).
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improvements consistent with that original public purpose.17 One
interpretation of the Butler Act is that it encouraged development of lands
considered without value into areas which would "benefit" the public.179
Vesting of property rights was an incentive to encourage growth. Harbor
development would be impossible without associated dredging. Therefore,
the legislature must have intended dredging to be a permanent
improvement. Otherwise, riparian owners would only have an incentive to
fill out to the edge of the channel rather than dredge, which could possibly
impede navigation.
The Fourth District also averred that the more general term "permanent
improvement" should take its meaning from the more specific terms found
earlier in the Butler Act.I" This rule of construction would have greater
weight if both the general and specific terms were included in the Act at
the same time. However, the term "permanent improvement" was added

178. See 3 SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 63.05 (5th ed. 1992), which provides:
Where a public grant has as its purpose the promotion of great public enterprises
and the welfare, prosperity and development of the community, the basic policy
behind the rule of strict interpretation is dissolved, and the courts are inclined
towards a liberal policy to insure the beneficent operation of the statute ....
[G]rants opening new lines ofcommunication and transportation, including grants
to railroads... grants made to encourage reclamation or settlement of otherwise
valueless land... have been held to come within this category.
179. An excerpt from State ex rel. Buford v. City of Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 102 So. 336 (1918),

provides an interesting perspective on courts' view of the utility of submerged land at that time:
It is well known that in the respective States which lie along the margin of the
Atlantic there are many places where the tide ebbs and flows, and which therefore
are public, that are of no navigable use and in their original condition without the
aid of art and industry afford to the public little or no advantage of any kind. Flats
and marshes covered with water only at full tide. In many cases such waste places
have been built up, docks or piers run over them to navigable water by the riparian
proprietor, and the public have been thereby very considerably the gainers. But
that condition in no wise affects the common law, but is one which commends
itself to the Legislatures of the respective states for the adoption of such
regulations as may be deemed to be for the best interests of the people.
This language is just as applicable to such places as lie along the margin of the
Gulf of Mexico and to shoal tide waters where the depth averages from three
inches to three or four feet and which lie near to, or within, the limits of municipal
corporations, the centers of industry and commerce.
Il at 202-03, 102 So. at 338 (internal quotations omitted).
180. See City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund, 714 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
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in 1921.181 If the Legislature intended the Act to apply only to wharves and
filling, it would have repeated those terms later in the statute instead of
using the phrase "bulkhead or filled in or permanently improved."'8 It is
possible that the legislature intended the Butler Act to expand on the
improvements listed in the Riparian Rights Act, considering "bulkheaded"
was also added in the Butler Act. The 1856 Act mentioned only filling and
construction of a "wharf" which is defined elsewhere as "a structure built
along or at an angle from the shore of navigable waters so that ships may
lie alongside to receive and discharge cargo and passengers."8 By
contrast, a "bulkhead" is a "retaining structure of timber, steel, or
reinforced concrete, used for shore protection and in harbor works." ' 4
In opposition to defining "improvements" as modifying an earlier word
in the Butler Act is the concept that words in a statute should be given their
common meaning unless it appears the words are used in a technical
sense.'85 When applied to real property, "improvement" is defined as
"bringing into a more valuable or desirable condition as of land or real
property; a making or becoming better; betterment... something done or
added to real property which increases its value."' 186 In City of West Palm
Beach, the City dredged the harbor to increase the value of the marina.'8 7
Without deep water access, the marina could cater only to very small boats.

181. See 1921 Fla. Laws ch. 8537 § 1.
182. Id.
183. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COUEGIATE DICTIONARY 1014 (2d ed. 1971).

184. City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund,
714 So. 2d 1060, 1062 n.4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citing TIE RANDOM HOUSE DICIONARY OFTHE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE 195 (unabridged ed., 1967)).
185. See 2A SUTHERLANDSTAT. CONST.§ 47.28 (5th ed. 1992); see also State etxreL Hanbury
v. Tunnicliffe, 98 Fla. 731,735, 124 So. 279,281 (1929) (holding that a term is presumed to have
its ordinary meaning unless it appears the term was used in a "technical or other sense").
186. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 421 (7th Ed. 1971). Black's Law

Dictionary defines "improvement" as:
A valuable addition made to property (usually real estate) or an amelioration in its
condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement of waste, costing
labor or capital, and intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it
for new or further purposes. Generally has reference to buildings, but may also
include any permanent structure or other development, such as a street, sidewalks,
sewers, utilities, etc.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 757 (6th ed. 1990). In section 713.01(12) of the Florida Statutes,
"improve" means to "build, erect, place, make, alter, remove, repair, or demolish any improvement
over, upon, connected with or beneath the surface of real property, or excavate any land." Further,
section 713.01(13) ofthe Florida Statutes defines "improvement" to mean "any building, structure,
construction, demolition, excavation, landscaping or any part thereofexisting, built, erected, placed,
made or done on land or other real property for its permanent benefit."
187. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 2-4, City of West Palm Beach (No. 95-3813).
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The Fourth District also referenced Williamsv. Guthrie'88 to support the
proposition that the Florida Supreme Court had ruled that wooden docks
were not even permanent enough to qualify as a permanent improvement
under the Butler Act. 189 However, Williams v. Guthrie did not directly
address the issue of whether a wooden dock would qualify as a permanent
improvement. Williams v. Guthrie involved a suit for ejectment between
two private parties to determine who had superior title to a dock."9
The issue of docks under the Butler Act was more recently addressed
in Department of NaturalResources v. IndustrialPlastics Technology,
Inc. 91 In IndustrialPlastics,the Fifth District found that wooden docks
were permanent improvements pursuant to the Butler Act. " Significantly,
the Fifth District stated that while wooden docks "may [not] last as long as
structures made of steel and concrete,... [they] last long enough in the
context of human life to be classified as 'permanent improvements."" 93
The Fourth District also implied that dredging is not truly permanent
because dredged areas must periodically be re-dredged to maintain their
depth.' 94 However, docks, piers, and bulkheads must be maintained and
periodically replaced because of age or weather. The only difference is in
the frequency of maintenance. In addition, some areas in Florida required
blasting of limestone rock to dredge a channel for access. Even though
these channels still need maintenance dredging to remove silt, this type of
dredging is arguably more permanent.
The Fourth District also claimed that inclusion of dredged lands
associated with structural improvements is inconsistent with the portion of
the Butler Act which provides that the public shall not be prohibited from
access to the submerged lands for boating, bathing or fishing until the

188. 102Fia. 1047, 137 So. 682 (1931).
189. See City of West Palm Beach, 714 So. 2d at 1065.
190. See Williams, 137 So. at 683-85.
191. 603 So. 2d 1303, 1306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). In IndustrialPlastics,landowners sought
a disclaimer from the Department of Natural Resources, pursuant to section 253.129, Florida

Statutes, for land lying beneath a wooden dock and boathouse. See id. at 1304. The Department
refused to grant the disclaimer, arguing that the predecessors in title did not legally own the upland
property when they built the dock and boathouse. See id. at 1305. The court rejected this argument

and found that the Butler Act does not preclude those who have at least a beneficial interest from
qualifying for the vesting provision of the Act. See id.
Alternatively, the Department contended that the wooden dock and boathouse did not constitute
"permanent improvements" for the purpose of the Butler Act. See id. The court concluded that the

Butler Act was not restricted to commercial property, making this residential property eligible under
the Act. See id. at 1306. Finally, the court found that while the improvements "may [not] last as
long as structures made of steel and concrete.... [they] last long enough in the context of human
life to be classified as 'permanent improvements"' Id.
192. See i

193. Id.
194. See City of West Palm Beach, 714 So. 2d at 1065.
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lands are filled or improved. 95 The court reasoned that since all of these
activities are permissible over dredged lands, the legislature must not have
intended dredging to be a permanent improvement. 196 However, some of
these activities are also permissible under docks or piers which have been
adjudged permanent improvements pursuant to the Butler Act.1 Moorings
are another example of a permanent improvement that would allow free
access to the public in the overlying waters. Perhaps the statute was just
stating the obvious, that is, that the public would not be physically able to
engage in boating, fishing or swimming once certain improvements have
been made. Another explanation is that if the activities are possible, the
statute cannot divest the land of the public right to boat, fish or swim and
to the federal right of navigation under the Commerce Clause. Regardless
of the explanation, removing dredging from the equation does not
harmonize the various sections of the Butler Act.
2. Implications of Allowing Associated
Dredging to Vest Title
On rehearing the Fourth District implied that including dredged lands
would be against public policy because the City could fill the land. 9
However, ownership of the submerged lands would not exempt the City
from any federal or state permitting requirements.' While the trial court
apparently realized the need for permits regardless of whether the City
owned the property, the trial court seemed to imply that permitting to fill
lands is an easy process.2" On the contrary, any mass filling by the City
would likely be prevented by federal and state permitting regulations."1
The biggest difference between the City owning the property and not
owning the property would be that the City would have to pay a lease fee
to the BOTIITF. This would probably be a great financial hardship to the
City considering the current base lease fee is calculated by the square

195. See id. at 1064 (quoting Williams, 137 So. at 686).
196. See id.
197. See IndustrialPlastics,603 So. 2d at 1306.
198. See City of West Palm Beach, 714 So. 2d at 1061.
199. See Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, 86 So. 2d 775, 786 (Fla.
1956) (stating that the state may grant trust lands to private parties "but not so as to divert them
from their proper uses, or so as to relieve the state of the control and regulation of the uses afforded
by the land and waters") (quoting State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 612, 47 So. 353, 356

(1908)).
200. See City of West Palm Beach, 714 So. 2d at 1060-66.
201. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1998) (allowing denial of dredge and fill permitting which
would result in unacceptable adverse impacts on shellfish beds, fishery areas, wildlife or
recreational areas); FLA. STAT. § 373.414 (1998) (requiring applicants who propose activities in
surface waters to provide reasonable assurances that the activity is not contrary to the public

interest).
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foot,2" and the boat basin in question is over 21 acres. 3 In addition, the
BOTIlTF has discretion to issue and renew leases, so theoretically, the City
could lose a lease in any given year.
The bottom line is that if the City owns the land, it is very unlikely that
the City would be able to obtain the necessary permits to fill the land. In
addition, there is no indication that the City is interested in filling
considering the boat basin's fifty-two year existence.
3. The "Amorphous" Case-by-Case Basis Test
The Fourth District Court of Appeal criticized a "case-by-case"
approach to defining a permanent improvement as "too amorphous ... to
decide the issue of title to irreplaceable submerged land within the public
trust." 4 However, a case-by-case approach may be the most appropriate.
Case-by-case, factor-based, and reason-based tests are not unknown in
environmental law. Their use highlights the diversity of the environment.
In addition, the case-by-case approach would help identify dredging which
is part of a larger improvement project. It seems counter-intuitive to
arbitrarily omit the dredging aspect of a project as if the Florida Legislature
would not have considered dredging as a necessary incident to waterfront
development. A case-by-case test would also provide the basis to evaluate
other activities that may be characterized as "permanent improvement."
IV. CONCLUSION

Some argue that the principles of the public trust doctrine should not
apply to Butler Act decisions at all because the doctrine was not codified
by the Florida Constitution until 1971 . Accordingly, improvements made
pursuant to the Butler Act, which was passed according to development
standards in 1921, should not be evaluated under the "modem" concept of
the public trust. However, this concept does not ring true considering the
long history of the public trust. The validity of the public trust doctrine was
recognized long before it was included in Florida's Constitution. The
question which remains, however, is which version of the public trust
doctrine should be applied and when.
Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court will have to evaluate whether the
Butler Act should be interpreted with the understanding of the public trust
doctrine of its era or a more modem understanding of the public trust
doctrine. When the Butler Act was enacted, the state enlisted landowners
202. See FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. R.18-21.01 (1)(b) (1998).
203. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 2, City of West Palm Beach (No. 95-3813).
204. City of West Palm Beach, 714 So. 2d at 1066.
205. See, e.g., Appellee's Answer Brief at 20, State v. Key West Conch Harbor, Inc., 683 So.
2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (No. 95-1275). See FA. CONST. art. X, § 11.
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to help improve commerce. Landowners and municipalities responded by
taking steps which the landowners and municipalities thought would vest
title in submerged land under the Butler Act. The modem conception of the
public trust considers the environmental and conservation impacts of
statutory interpretation. Therefore, courts today might apply the public trust
doctrine to construe "permanent improvement" more strictly. Thus,
improvements which the 1921 legislature may have considered appropriate
would not be included within the Act. Admittedly, the modem conception
of the public trust is consistent with current views of how the government
should protect the environment. However, since vesting under the Butler
Act took place prior to the evolution of the public trust, it may not be fair
to apply the new standard.
Allowing associated dredging to vest title pursuant to the Butler Act
under certain circumstances seems more appropriate than an absolute rule
that dredging will never vest title. The case-by-case basis test may be a
legitimate first step toward the type of principled approach the Florida
Supreme Court should adopt. Of course, this approach is not flawless, as
it could be applied in a non-uniform manner. However, an absolutist
approach could yield more unfair and inappropriate results. Moreover, tests
dealing with impacts on the environment are infrequently cast in black and
white. In light of the Butler Act's history, the issue of whether associated
dredging or any other activity is a "permanent improvement" should be
approached with balance.
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